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What can we learn from 25 years of PUS survey
research? Liberating and expanding the agenda
Martin W. Bauer, Nick Allum and Steve Miller
This paper reviews key issues of public understanding of science (PUS)
research over the last quarter of a century. We show how the discussion has
moved in relation to large-scale surveys of public perceptions by tracing
developments through three paradigms: science literacy, public understand-
ing of science and science and society. Naming matters here like elsewhere as
a marker of “tribal identity.” Each paradigm frames the problem differently,
poses characteristic questions, offers preferred solutions, and displays a
rhetoric of “progress” over the previous one. We argue that the polemic over
the “deficit concept” voiced a valid critique of a common sense concept
among experts, but confused the issue with methodological protocol. PUS
research has been hampered by this “essentialist” association between the
survey research protocol and the public deficit model. We argue that this
fallacious link should be severed to liberate and to expand the research
agenda in four directions: contextualizing survey research, searching for
cultural indicators, integrating datasets and doing longitudinal analysis, and
including other data streams. Under different presumptions, assumed and
granted, we anticipate a fertile period for survey research on public under-
standing of science.
1. “Paradigms” for understanding the public’s understanding of science
Over the last 20 years the public understanding of science (PUS) has spawned a field of
enquiry that engages, to a greater or lesser degree, sociology, psychology, history, political
science, communication studies, and science policy analysis. Much discussion has con-
cerned the polemic over the “deficit model” and its in essence quantitative research
methodologies. As the polemic has it, PUS researchers conduct survey research in the
service of sponsors such as government, business and scientific institutions. Survey
researchers necessarily presume a public deficient in knowledge, attitude or trust. Thus they
serve existing powers, and provide rhetorical means-to-given-ends. In contrast, so the
polemic has it, the “Critical” researcher will also research the ends, the means and the
context of PUS research, using exclusively qualitative protocols, which will introduce
reflexivity. This polemic is reminiscent of Lazarsfeld’s (1941) dichotomy of “admin-
istrative” and “critical” research, but with a strange fixation on method protocol that was
absent in the original discussion.1
The problem with this polemic is the automatic equation of particular agendas with
particular research protocols: survey research means deficit modeling for an administrative
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agenda; qualitative methodology is the sine qua non of “Critical” and reflexive investigation.
Thus, valid critiques of the deficit model, and the agendas sponsoring it, have resulted in
stigmatizing survey research. In contrast, we consider the association of method protocol
and knowledge interest a fallacy (Bauer et al., 2000a). The identification of protocol and
interest is “behaviouristic.” But any behavior can serve different motives, and results
produced to serve one interest can easily be useful for different interests: while lower
animals are blessed with relatively fixed linkages between motive and behavior, Homo
sapiens is unfortunate in that respect, and pays the price of anxieties and mutual
misunderstandings. Like motive and behavior in everyday life, in social research, knowledge
interest and method protocol are flexibly linked.
In Table 1, we outline three “paradigms” of research in chronological order of origin.
Each paradigm has its prime time, more or less clearly defined, and is characterized by a
diagnosis of the problem that science faces in its relationship with the public. A key feature
of each paradigm is the attribution of a deficit. Each paradigm defines particular problems
and offers preferred solutions. We argue that, contrary to common rhetoric, these paradigms
do not supersede each other, but continue to inform research.
2. Scientific Literacy (from 1960s to mid 1980s)
The idea of “scientific literacy” builds on a double analogy. Science is part of the cultural
stock of knowledge with which everybody ought to be familiar. Scientific education ties in
with the quest for “basic literacy” in reading, writing and numeracy. The second analogy is
“political literacy.” Here the idea is that in a democracy people take part in political
decisions, directly in referenda or indirectly via elections or as voices of public opinion.
However, voice can only be effective if people command knowledge of the political process
and its institution (see Althaus, 1996). The literacy idea attributes a knowledge deficit to an
insufficiently literate public. This deficit model serves the education agenda, demanding
increased efforts in science education at all stages of the life cycle. However, it also plays
into the hands of technocratic attitudes among decision makers: a de facto ignorant public is
disqualified from participating in science policy decisions.
An influential concept of “science literacy” was proposed by Jon D. Miller (1983, 1987,
1992, 1998). Miller’s definition included four elements: a) knowledge of basic textbook
Table 1. Paradigms, problems and proposals
Period Attribution Problems Proposals Research
Science Literacy
1960s onwards
Public deficit
Knowledge
Literacy measures
Education
Public Understanding
After 1985
Public deficit
Attitudes
Education
Knowledge–attitude
Attitude change
Image marketing
Science and Society
1990s–present
Trust deficit
Expert deficit
Notions of public
Crisis of confidence
Participation
Deliberation
“Angels” mediators
Impact evaluation
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facts of science, b) an understanding of scientific methods such as probability reasoning and
experimental design, c) an appreciation of the positive outcomes of science and technology
for science, and d) the rejection of superstitious beliefs such as astrology or numero-
logy. Miller constructed survey based indicators for literacy, based on earlier work (Withey,
1959; see also the review of Etzioni and Nunn, 1976), which became the basis of the
biannual science indicator surveys of the US National Science Foundation (NSF) from the
late 1970s onwards.
The research problems
The psychometrics of factual knowledge is the key problem of this paradigm. Knowledge is
measured by quiz-like textbook items. Respondents are asked to decide whether a statement
of a scientific fact is true, false or they don’t know. Some of these items have become
notorious, have traveled the globe, and hit the headlines: for example, the Ptolemaeic item
“the sun goes round the earth” (true or false), or “electrons are smaller than atoms” or “all
radioactivity is man-made” (see Eurobarometer 31, 1989; Durant et al., 1989). Respondents
score a point for every correct answer. It is an empirical problem to formulate short and
unambiguous statements for which the authoritative answer can be determined, and to
balance easy and difficult items from various fields of science (item analysis). Recently item
response theory (IRT) has been brought into the discussion (Miller and Pardo, 2000). As
literacy indicators, these items are of value only in combination; a single item has little
significance. However, public speakers and the mass media repeatedly pick out stand-alone
items as indicators of public ignorance and reasons for moral panic. So for example, recently
the London Observer (21 October 2005) cited CNN for the results of “the-sun-goes-around-
the-earth-item” under the heading “The American World View.”2
So, what counts as scientific knowledge? Miller suggested two dimensions: facts and
methods. This stimulated efforts to operationalize “knowledge of scientific methods” such as
probability reasoning, experimental design, the importance of theory and hypothesis testing.
Useful in this context is an open question initially suggested by Withey (1959): “Tell me in
your own words, what does it mean to study something scientifically.” Respondents’ answers
are recorded verbatim and coded for an index of methodological awareness. However, the
coding of these responses remains controversial: normative or descriptive (see Bauer and
Schoon, 1993)? Critics have argued that the key to understanding science is its process and
not its facts (e.g. Collins and Pinch, 1993). Therefore awareness of issues such as
uncertainty, peer reviewing, scientific controversies, and replication of experiments should
be reflected in the assessment of literacy. Furthermore, relevant knowledge includes that of
the scientific institution and its politics, what Prewitt (1983) called “scientific savvy” and
Wynne (1996) has called the “body language” of science. The latter dimension has to date
received little attention (although see Bauer et al., 2000b; Sturgis and Allum, 2004).
What is to be done: education
The literacy paradigm is concerned with the public deficit of scientific knowledge.
Interventions are mainly in the area of public education. A deficit in adult scientific literacy
requires increased attention in school curricula and continuing education to achieve goals
such as those proposed in the US Project 2061.3
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Critique: artefacts and different kinds of knowledge
The critique of the literacy paradigm focuses on conceptual as well as empirical issues. Why
does scientific knowledge deserve special attention? What about historical, financial or legal
literacy? Critics argued that large-scale survey measures reify knowledge and produce
irrelevant indicators of “textbook knowledge.” Miller’s 1983 definition of science literacy
included a “positive appreciation of the outcomes of science.” This definition precludes a
knowledgeable person from having negative attitudes towards science. However, the
correlation between knowledge of science and agreeing to statements such as “science and
technology are making our lives healthier, easier and more comfortable” or “the benefits of
science are greater than any harmful effects” (e.g. Eurobarometer 31, 1989) must be an
empirical matter, and cannot be resolved as a normative requirement for literacy.
Miller’s original proposal to the NSF was that scientific literacy was a threshold
measure. To qualify as a member of the “attentive public for science,” one needed to
command “some” minimal level of literacy, be interested in and feel informed about science
and technology, appreciate their positive outcomes, and renounce superstitions. However,
the definition of this “minimal level of literacy” changed from audit to audit, and it is
unclear whether the changes that the NSF reported, or for that matter lack of changes, reflect
shifts in definition or in substance (see e.g. Beveridge and Rudell, 1988).
Since the 1970s, many countries have undertaken audits of adult scientific literacy—the
US, Canada, China, Brazil, India, Korea, Japan, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Singapore, Britain,
Germany and France and many other EU countries—although access to the raw data
remains problematic. The US NSF has presented “horse race” type ranking of different
countries’ literacy. A possible problem of such comparisons remains the fairness of the
indicators. A particular set of knowledge items may be biased towards certain countries.
Countries have different science bases, and literacy is likely to reflect the country’s
historical science base (e.g. Raza et al., 1996, 2002). The issue of culturally sensitive
literacy measures deserves more attention.
Then, there is the question of superstitions. Belief in astrology disqualifies one from
being scientifically literate, Miller (1983, 1987) suggested. However, the co-existence of
forms of “superstition” and scientific literacy is an empirical matter. To make “belief in
astrology” an exclusion criterion for literacy bars us from understanding the variable
tolerance/intolerance of science and “superstitions” as cultural variable (see Boy and
Michelat, 1986; Bauer and Durant, 1997). Finally, it is suggested that the concern for
literacy arises in parallel with the crisis of legitimacy of “big science.” But, if the Baconian
notion of “knowledge = power” holds, any attempt to share big science knowledge without
public empowerment might only create alienation rather than rapprochement. Literacy is
therefore the wrong answer to a problem of crisis (Roqueplo, 1974; Fuller, 2000).
3. Public Understanding of Science (1985 to mid 1990s)
In the second half of the 1980s, new concerns emerge under the title public understanding
of science (PUS).4 In the UK this transition is marked by an internationally influential
report (Royal Society, 1985). PUS shares with the previous phase the diagnosis of a public
deficit. However, this time round, it is public attitudes that are highlighted (Bodmer, 1987).
The public is not positive enough about science and technology; there are dangers citizens
will become negative or outright anti-science, and this is of natural concern to institutions
of science.
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The research problems
For PUS, the research agenda shifts away from the measurement of knowledge to that of
public attitudes. Such measurements have a long tradition in social psychology (see Eagly
and Chaiken, 1993). Research became concerned with the construction of reliable attitude-
to-science scales, the potential “acquiescence response bias” in existing attitude batteries
(Bauer et al., 1994), the multi-dimensional structure of attitudes (e.g. Pardo and Calvo,
2002), the relationship between general attitudes and specific attitudes (Daamen and
vanderLans, 1995), the effects of question ordering on interest levels (e.g. Gaskell et al.,
1993) and, most importantly, the relationship between knowledge and attitudes (Einsiedel,
1994; Evans and Durant, 1995). The concern for scientific literacy carried over into PUS. A
knowledge measure is needed to test the expectation “the more you know, the more you love
it.” However, the emphasis shifts from a threshold measure to that of a continuum: not “one
is either literate or not,” but “one is more or less knowledgeable.” The correlation between
knowledge and attitudes becomes the focus of research (Evans and Durant, 1989; Durant et
al., 2000).
Some research looked at “don’t know” (DK) responses to knowledge measures.
Comparing incorrect and DK responses offers an index of confidence: women and some
milieus seem generally more likely to declare ignorance and hesitate to guess the science
(see Bauer, 1996; Mondak and Anderson, 2003). Turner and Michael (1996) suggested four
types of self-admitted ignorance of science: “I am embarrassed not to know”; “I am not very
scientific”; “I know somebody who might know”; and “I could not care less.” Finally,
differences in the rates of DK responses over time or across contexts need to be interpreted
with care, as they might reflect artefacts due to different fieldwork protocols (for example
Eurobarometer changes its contractors every 5 years and with it the fieldwork protocols
which might affect DK rates).
What is to be done: either educate the public or seduce the public
Old and new reasons for the promotion of science in public are put forward: understanding
is important for making informed consumer choices; it enhances the competitiveness of the
nation’s industry and commerce; and it is part of tradition and culture (see Thomas and
Durant, 1987; Durant, 1993; Gregory and Miller, 1998). It might be said that the PUS
paradigm calls upon a rationalist and a realist agenda. Both agree with the diagnosis of an
attitudinal deficit—the public is insufficiently in love with science and technology but they
disagree on what to do about it.
For the normative-rationalist, attitudes are a product of information processing with a
rational core. The axiom of PUS is “the more you know, the more you love it”; lack of
knowledge is the driver of negative attitudes and biased risk perceptions. A knowledgeable
public will agree with experts, who do not succumb to biases as the public does. The battle
for the public is a battle for rational minds trained in probabilistic reasoning (Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage, 1995).
For the realist-empiricist, attitudes are value-loaded relations with the world. How
values and emotions may relate to reason is a vexing question, one that is traditionally
confused by conflating values and emotion, and cognition and emotion with rationality and
irrationality. For the realists, values and emotion are a fact of life and the battle is a battle for
hearts of a lifestyle public. For a “consumer,” it is claimed, there is little difference between
science, a car and washing powder. So they receive the same treatment of market
segmentation, profiling, targeted campaigning and message positioning. British science
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consumers are thus divided into six groups (see OST, 2000): confident believers, techno-
philes, supporters, concerned, the “not sure,” and the “not for me” similarly found in
Portugal (Costa et al., 2002).
Critique: institutional neuroticism
Both the scientific literacy and PUS paradigm assume a public state of deficiency: citizens
lack either enough or the right kind of knowledge, and thus fail to display sufficiently
positive attitudes or “reasonable” risk perceptions. But, some critics argue, of far more
importance is knowledge-in-context that emerges from local controversies and people’s life
concerns (see Ziman, 1991; Irwin and Wynne, 1996). Here the internationally influential
British Research Programme on Public Understanding of Science between 1986 and 1991
became entrenched in conflicts over how to study the public understanding of science.5
Wynne (1993) saw the deficit model as an expression of “institutional neuroticism,”
anxieties and a lack of generosity among scientific actors vis-a-vis the public. The deficit
model is a self-serving rhetorical device and at the heart of a vicious circle: a deficient
public cannot be trusted. Mistrust on the part of scientific actors is returned in kind by the
public. Negative public attitudes, revealed in large-scale surveys, confirm the assumptions of
scientists: a deficient public is not to be trusted. An “institutional unconsciousness” called
for “soul searching” among scientific actors. However valid, this critique stigmatized survey
research by identifying survey research in essence with the deficit model (see Wynne, 1995;
Irwin and Wynne, 1996; also Jasanoff, 2005) and thus established a spurious but lasting
association between method protocol and concept.6
Some have argued for a reframing of the issues. Attitudes could be seen within the
framework of social representations of science, their variable structure and diverse func-
tions. Representations arise when local common sense encounters novelty; they allow
familiarization of the unfamiliar within the constraints of tradition and inter-group relations
(Farr, 1993). This framework refocuses research from rank orderings of groups of people to
characterizing the diversity of representations (e.g. Boy, 1989; Bauer and Schoon, 1993;
Durant et al., 1992). Studying representations opens the door not only for qualitative
enquiry, but also for different types of analyses of survey data (see Bauer and Gaskell,
1999).
While the PUS paradigm was fixated on the common sense axiom “the more you know,
the more you love it,” empirical investigations of the knowledge/attitude relationship have
remained inconclusive until recently. Surveys do show a small positive correlation between
knowledge and positive attitudes, but they also show larger variance among the knowledge-
able: with controversial issues, the correlation tends to be lower or zero (Allum et al., 2007).
Thus, not all informed citizens are also enthusiastic; for some “familiarity breeds contempt”
for science and technology. Furthermore, in attitude theory, it is well known that knowledge
is not a lever of positive attitudes, but of the quality of attitudes. Attitudes—both positive or
negative—that are based on knowledge are more likely to resist change (see Eagly and
Chaiken, 1993); knowledge makes the difference between attitudes and non-attitudes, and
not between positive or negative attitudes (Converse, 1964). It has also emerged that
positive attitudes to science and technology are related to general “political sophistication”
as well as to a specific scientific literacy (Sturgis and Allum, 2004; Gaskell et al., 2003).
Many PUS surveys compare interest in science with other life interests. Aggregate figures
from Eurobarometer surveys suggest that interest in science is declining between 1992 and
2001, while knowledge is increasing (Miller et al., 2002). This trend would suggest that
“familiarity breeds disinterest.”
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4. Science and Society (from mid 1990s onwards)
The critique of the literacy and PUS paradigms as “deficit models” ushered in a reversal of
attribution. The diagnosis of “institutional neurosis” has been widely heeded: the deficit is
not with the public, but with the scientific institutions and expert actors who harbor
prejudices about an ignorant public. Henceforth, there can be several deficits: public deficits
of knowledge, attitude or trust, but also deficits on the part of scientific and technological
institutions and their expert representatives. Now, the focus of attention shifted to the deficit
of the technical experts.
The research problems
Evidence of negative attitudes from large-scale surveys, from focus group research and
quasi-ethnographic observations led to the declaration of a “crisis of public confidence”
(House of Lords, 2000; Miller, 2001) in Britain and elsewhere. Science and technology
operate in society, and therefore stand related to other sectors of society. A crisis of trust of
the public vis-a-vis science indicates a breach of contract that needs a re-negotiation. The
implicit and explicit views of the public held by scientific experts come under scrutiny, they
explain part of the trust crisis. False conceptions of the public operate in science policy
making and misguide communication efforts of scientific institutions which alienate the
public still further.
What is to be done: up-stream public engagement
In the “Science and Society” paradigm, the distinction between research and intervention is
blurred. Many researchers are committed to action research and reject the separation of
analysis and intervention. The aim of analysis is to change institutions and policy. This
agenda, academically grounded as it may be, often ends in political advice with a pragmatist
outlook. The implicit and dysfunctional notions of public, public opinion and the public
sphere among experts and policy makers are the focus of closed executive training seminars
and advisory panel discussions rather than of publicly documented research results.
Advice is confidently offered to public and private actors on how to rebuild public trust,
and to address the paradoxes of trust: once an issue, trust is already lost; trust cannot be
engineered, it is granted to those who deserve it (see Luhmann, 1968). Public deliberation
and participation are the new “royal road” to rebuild public trust. The UK House of Lords
Report (2000) listed many forms of deliberative activities such as citizen juries, deliberative
opinion polling, hearings, consensus conferencing, national debates to engage the public and
to rebuild trust. And efforts of public engagement should be undertaken up-stream, which
means at the early stages of new technoscientific developments (Stilgoe et al., 2005) to
enable front-end inputs and not only post-hoc reactions to already established facts.
Critique: of “angels” and “monaud”
The prolific writing on the governance of science promotes public participation as part of a
“New Deal” (e.g. Fuller, 2000), and has created a market for consultancy. As public
engagement takes time and needs know-how, civil servants and public academics are
overwhelmed by this managerial task. Here, the new sector of “angels” steps in. “Angels”
are age-old go-betweens that mediate, here not between heaven and earth, but between a
disenchanted public and the institutions of science, industry and policy making. Books
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describe the how-tos of “good practice” and the financial implications of public delibera-
tions (e.g. Seargent and Steele, 1998). This industry of public engagement advice exudes
confidence on how to overcome the crisis of trust between science and the public.
In the UK, the idea of public consultation has become official government policy. Not
only for science and technology, public consultation beyond the parliamentary process has
become “due process.” In the UK and beyond, we see the proliferation of new labels for
public participation, a product differentiation in the logic of a market of consultancies.7
What is urgently needed is a typology of public engagement activities to inform critical
judgment.
There is as yet little critique of the achievements. The general ethos of public
participation recently acquired an interest in evaluating its outcomes. In the utilitarian spirit
of modern politics sooner or later the question arises: and what does this approach bring
(effectiveness)? And how do different approaches compare? Can one save money with a
cheaper approach doing equally well as a more expensive one (efficiency)? These questions
call for evaluation criteria so that such activities can be audited (e.g. Rowe and Frewer,
2004).
The apparent success of the “science and society” agenda in the UK has caused
embarrassment among its protagonists as demonstrated by GM Nation in 2003. The focus on
reaching a social consensus raises a number of questions. For example, will “dialogue” be
appropriated by the technocratic deficit model as a strategy of public persuasion? Is this all
old wine in new bottles? These doubts seems to be vindicated by the GM Nation debate, the
great consultation in 2003 on genetically modified (GM) crops and food products in the UK
(Rowe et al., 2005).8 This extended national debate produced evidence that the British
public was far from convinced of the benefits of GM crops and foods—not what the
government hoped to hear. There were two responses: to attack the process on protocol for
allowing environmental groups to have too much influence; or on outcome and to conclude
that further dialogue was needed until the public had the “right” attitude. In this way,
consensus is reached by “monaud”: all “sides” are talking; but only the public is supposed
to listen.
5. Liberating and expanding the research agenda
Is the path from “Scientific Literacy” to “Science and Society” a path of progress? Clearly
the protagonists of each phase use rhetorics of Progress writ large. PUS researchers claimed
that they had left behind the limited concern with scientific literacy and they moved on to
attitudes. For the Science and Society protagonists, research of both literacy and public
attitudes are “old hat” and buried with the deficit model. Public participation, and for that
matter “angelic” mediation, is the new mission; empirical social research becomes a
somewhat anachronistic preoccupation. Progress, or is it?
Ironically, the call for evaluation of participatory policy making invites a re-entry of
traditional paradigms of PUS research. Researchers come to advocate quasi-experimental
evaluation of deliberative events (Macoubrie, 2005), using indicators such as media
coverage, shifts in issue awareness, knowledge and attitudes, and impact on policy agendas
(e.g. Butschi and Nentwich, 2002; Joss and Bellucci, 2002). With ignorance of its history,
this revival of the classical paradigms of PUS might amount to the reinvention of the wheel,
but this time for a different car. Public deficit is no longer under scrutiny, but the
performances of “angels” who spend public monies. Additionally, the international survey
of educational achievement (PISA) of 2006 has focused on “scientific literacy,” albeit for
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children of school age (PISA, 2006). These international studies might well re-launch the
discussions over adult literacy. If we dare make a prediction, it will be that PUS research,
based on survey, focus group and media analysis, will revive, albeit within the wider
framework of science and society.
And as long as science and society are not identical, the public’s understanding of
science as well as the scientists’ understanding of the public will continue to be a pressing
issue. In this changing context, we envisage four major developments of PUS research:
various ways of contextualizing the survey evidence; cultural indicators; longitudinal data
integration and analysis; and a widening of the range of data.
Political sophistication: reframing the knowledge–attitude problem
One possible cause of the limited progress of PUS research is perhaps to be found in the
multi-disciplinary character of the whole enterprise. Research is carried out by psycholo-
gists, sociologists, political scientists, cultural theorists; even philosophers are increasingly
getting in on the act. Whilst this must confer some advantages in broadening the range of
perspectives and the explanations that are judged plausible, the lack of common foundations
has led to reluctance on the part of PUS researchers to see the public’s relationship with
science and technology as but one example of the range of political and social issues
relevant to citizens in modern democracies.
An example of the relative weakness of PUS research becomes apparent when
compared to the voluminous research from political scientists on the causes and conse-
quences of knowledge on political attitudes and behavior. In this field, there has been a
stream of empirical research and theoretical debate that dates back to the early 1960s. A
consistent finding is that a large proportion of the public, generally uninformed, responds
randomly to questions about political issues of the day. The early work of Converse (1964)
on “non-attitudes” and other researchers showed that the extent to which citizens make
informed or ill-informed judgments about political issues makes a profound difference to
collective decision-making (Althaus, 1996, 1998; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). The non-
attitudes thesis was criticized as a “measurement error” problem (Achen, 1975). More
recently “online-processing” has been proposed: people may use information momentarily
to form opinions but will be unable to recall the information later on (Hastie and Park,
1986). There are also models that link information, knowledge and values in the formation
of preferences, and the role of “cues” as substitutes for political information (Zaller, 1991,
1992). Evidence from the political science literature leads us to begin with the assumption
that for attitudes towards science and technology, as for other issues of the day, information
matters, as well as the ability and motivation to process it, unless proven otherwise.
The PUS activity context: benchmarking PUS within an indicator framework
Public interest, knowledge and attitudes to science must also be seen in the context of the
“PUS movement,” its motives, actors, repertoire and resources. For many people, the
“public understanding of science” became a rallying cry from the mid 1980s onwards, a
banner around which to gather and to do better work. Among the actors we find,
traditionally the visible scientists communicating to a wider audience (e.g. Werskey, 1978).
But there are also the professional science writers in newspapers, magazines, on radio and
television or of popular books. Then there are the staffs of science museums and the more
recent science centers. Increasingly there are the press officers of scientific laboratories,
scientific bodies and universities. Their repertoire includes exhibitions, science festivals,
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news events, press office work, science reportage in the press, radio and television, popular
science books and cinema, public hearings, meetings, Internet websites, consensus confer-
ences, deliberative opinion polls, tables rondes, citizen juries etc. These activities grow in
scope with new communication technology. Auxiliary efforts in “science communication”
training have proliferated—an industry feeding on an industry, and becoming part of the
available resources.
All these activities draw on public or private sponsorship. Resources also include ideals
and motivation to bring science and the public ever closer. Ideals of public education
compete with self-interest, public entertainment, national pride in international competition,
or more managerial notions such as Public Relations (PR) for the purpose of creating a
favorable image for science or a particular institution. A public profile and favorable
images are important to sustain public goodwill that may translate into higher citation
counts and into funding for future research (e.g. Gregory and Miller, 1998; Gregory and
Bauer, 2003).
An inventory of this international PUS movement is urgently needed. Preliminary
inventories were attempted by Schiele (1994) for Europe, North America, Africa, Australia,
and Japan, and more recently, for Brazil by Massarani, Moreira and Brito (2002). In 2002,
the European Commission published its Report of the Expert Group Benchmarking the
Promotion of RTD Culture and Public Understanding of Science (Miller et al., 2002). The
report showed that Europe is heterogeneous in approaches and levels of activity, although
most actors address the “public deficits” that we discussed above. A problem is the lack of
knowledge of governments about what they themselves are doing: with few exceptions
(Ciencia Viva in Portugal and PUSH “Wissenschaft im Dialogue” in Germany) it was
impossible to find meaningful figures on the money being spent on PUS activities, let alone
to say if there was “value added” in what they were doing. Furthermore, in all but a few
countries, little is done to prepare scientific researchers for communication activity with lay
audiences, despite the commitment expressed in official documents. Perhaps surprisingly,
it appears that industrial actors have shown an increased interest in PUS and are moving to-
wards public engagement as part of corporate PR (see Burningham et al., 2007 in this issue).
How far the latter trend develops beyond a PR/marketing activity remains to be seen.
Towards cultural indicators
The idea that literacy and attitudes are part of a wider framework for the accounting of the
national science base, alongside the figures for research and development investments,
counts of publications and citations, patent outputs, and size of high tech industry, is not
new, but worth reiterating. Since the early 1980s the US NSF included the literacy surveys
in their Science Indicator Reports.9 Canadian researchers proposed an elaborate system of
indicators of PUS that included measures of education, mass media coverage and public
perceptions (Schiele, 1994; Godin and Gingras, 2000). Very recently, India has undertaken
its first India Science Report. Although based mainly on a large-scale survey of public
perceptions, it stipulates a model with a range of input and output indicators (Shukla, 2005).
The EU conducts occasional surveys of public perceptions, but these are hitherto isolated
and not part of the official science indicators and innovation scoring board.
One can look at PUS indicators also as comparative measures of performance of the
PUS movement. A performance indicator measures action-outcomes, and these outcomes
are supposed to be causally linked to these actions. They are used in planning, to set targets
and to evaluate the success and failure of these actions. But instead of evaluating
performance, they can be just as validly interpreted as indicators of the cultural climate.
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Cultural indicators measure the context of activities, they indicate the context-for-action
within which to make decisions (Bauer, 2000). Few actors consider a “culture” within their
remit; however, they will acknowledge performance as within their responsibility. This dual
purpose of PUS indicators encourages different types of data and analyses. As performance
indicators, the unit of analysis is typically the national polity. For cultural indicators, the unit
of analysis should be more flexible. Comparative analysis might focus on clustering
response patterns that indicate distinct patterns of attitudes rooted in transnational cultural
milieus. Here a combination of survey analysis, ethnographic data, and current and official
social statistics will be informative. The spatial distribution of political values has been
found to correlate with variations in historical kinship patterns across Europe; this might
serve as a model for how to map technoscientific cultures (Todd, 1996).
The polemic over surveys and the deficit concept encouraged alternative protocols of
research, such as discourse analysis of focus interviews and textual materials. Mass media
monitoring, in particular of newspapers, is cost effective and can be readily extended
historically. Such data reveal long-term trends such as the medicalization of science news
over the last 25 years (Bauer, 1998a) and non-trivial long waves in public attention to
science and technology (see LaFollette, 1990; Bauer et al., 1995; Bauer, 1998b; Bauer et
al., 2006).
Integrated databases for longitudinal analysis
A burgeoning field of research is the history of popular science. Historical studies reveal a
shifting repertoire of activities, ideologies and motives, a changing relationship between
science and society, and the various roles played by popular science in boundary work (see
Kohlstedt et al., 1999; Gieryn, 1999; Gregory and Miller, 1998). Studies of PUS with a
long-term perspective (e.g. Lewenstein, 1992; Bauer, 1998b) show a dynamic phenomenon.
And dynamic systems require continuous time-series data for an adequate representation.
But presently, PUS research is still dominated by snapshot studies of the shock-horror “20%
of X believe that the Sun goes around the Earth” or “35% believe that ordinary tomatoes do
not contain genes” variety. As snapshots, however, these figures only offer a projection
ground for moral panics: these figures only have meaning when compared in time (increase/
decrease) and space (higher/lower than) and in conjunction with similar items.
In the US (biennially since 1979), the UK (1986, 1988, 1996, 2000, 2004), France
(1972, 1982, 1989, 1996), and the EU (1989, 1992, 2000, 2005) the databases support
longitudinal analysis in principle. But, few efforts have been made to systematically
integrate these datasets. In the US, the NSF has recently consolidated the science indicator
data into a single file including the surveys from 1979 to 2001. Similar efforts seem to be
under way for the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) which has for many years
collected public perception data on various issues pertaining to science and technology. The
EU and Eurobarometer should follow suit. Consolidated databases will inform benchmark-
ing and contextualization. Integrated databases and longitudinal modeling will bring a step
change to PUS research. We might finally see dynamic modeling of public understanding of
science across national contexts.
Cross-sectional analyses have shown that the correlation between interest, knowledge
and attitudes is itself a variable. Examining this co-variation led to the developmental “two
culture model” of PUS. In this analysis, PUS in industrialized (e.g. France, UK) and
industrializing (e.g. Portugal, Ireland) countries is characterized among other things by a
higher correlation between interest, knowledge and attitudes, while in post-industrial
countries (e.g. Denmark, Germany) correlations are much lower (Bauer et al., 1994; Durant
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et al., 2000). Allum, Boy and Bauer (2002) tested this model with partial success across
European regions. The recent India Science Report (see Shukla, 2005) and attempts to
construct indicator surveys in Latin America, China, Japan and South Africa will globalize
this database. However, in order to finally test the “two cultures of PUS” hypothesis we need
longitudinal data in any one context. This kind of model-based, longitudinal analysis might
bring PUS research in fruitful dialogue with discussions on “civic epistemology” in science
and technology studies: i.e. the diversification of technoscientific culture in a globalized
context (Jasanoff, 2005).
Broadening the scope of data streams
Finally, our plea is to expand the range of data “officially and legitimately” relevant for
monitoring public understanding of science. Qualitative data have been used in the field for
some time, so have mass media analyses. But little effort has gone into persistent and
comparative collection and analysis of such data. Yet both mass media and qualitative
enquiry lend themselves to longitudinal data streaming, albeit the methodology might need
development. In this way, an inter-disciplinary field of enquiry like PUS might offer an
opportunity to make significant contributions to other disciplines by developing existing
methods with a longitudinal perspective. For example, the analysis of science reportage in
mass media yields long-term indicators of public salience and issue framing and might
contribute to a dynamic theory of social representations, a social psychological theory that
deals more generally with the transformation of knowledge across communities (see Wagner
and Hayes, 2005; Jovchelovitch, 2006).
6. Conclusion
We have traced the recent history of PUS research from “literacy” to “science and society”
and pointed to confusions around the “deficit concept.” Identifying the deficit model of the
public with survey research per se, and for that matter critical enquiry with qualitative
protocols, is fallacious and not useful beyond temporary rhetoric. The critique of the public
deficit model as a common sense prejudice among experts is valid, for certain, but its
identification with the protocol of survey research is dysfunctional. Breaking this un-
fortunate mind frame of linking model and protocol will help to liberate and expand the
research agenda. And we suggest that a liberated agenda might include: contextualizing
survey results through a reframing of the knowledge–attitude problem and within a
framework of science indicators, analyzing data in search for cultural indicators, the global
integration and analysis of longitudinal databases, and the mobilization of additional,
preferably qualitative data streams with a long-term perspective. As long as science and
society are not entirely identical spheres, the issues of the public’s understanding of science,
and of scientists’ understanding of the public, are here to stay. In this light, we are confident
that the field will see fertile and burgeoning research activities in the years to come.
Notes
1 At the time, Lazarsfeld was searching for a way to continue discussions with T.W. Adorno and his group. This
dichotomy is a simplification of a more complex issue which Habermas (1965) later caught in the triadic
distinction of technical-instrumental, practical-normative, and critical-emancipatory knowledge interests.
2 As an anecdote, John Durant used to recall a ride on the interstate highway through New Mexico, where a radio
program at 4 a.m. referred to the results of the Ptolemaeus question. There is clearly entertainment value in these
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items. More seriously, they are frequently cited by alarmed scientists in public lectures, keynote speeches, and
private and public meetings. They are rhetorical devices speakers, even unexpectedly love to call upon. So for
example the anthropologist Paul Rabinow, not known to think favorably on such data, made rhetorical use of
such survey items at a recent public lecture at the London School of Economics (BIOS annual lecture 2005).
3 “Project 2061” is an initiative of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) to advance
literacy of science, mathematics and technology for the long term; http://www.project2061.org/
4 PUS was also extended to PUST to include “T” for technology, PUSTE to include “E” for engineering, or PUSH
to include “H” for the humanities, the last indicating a more continental understanding of “science” as
“Wissenschaft.” The dating of these phases follows mainly the influential UK experience. In the US all through
the 1970s the AAAS had a standing Committee on Public Understanding of Science (see Kohlstedt et al., 1999:
140ff.).
5 One of the authors, Martin Bauer, joined the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) PUS research
program in the late 1980s as a part-time “number cruncher” for John Durant at the Science Museum in London.
He remembers that many of the members of this research program were on non-speaking terms. The debate
curiously centered on whether a team would use numerical or verbal-qualitative protocols for their observations.
The publication that finally presented the “main results” of this research program (Irwin and Wynne, 1996)
excluded the three numerical projects: the survey of the adults (Durant et al., 1989), the survey of adolescent
children (see Breakwell and Robertson, 2001), and the analysis of mass media reportage of science (Hansen and
Dickinson, 1992).
6 Whether such a spurious association was an intentional part of fights over academic territory in a context of
temporarily increasing funding streams, or just an unfortunate reading and side effect of the polemic over the
deficit model is difficult to ascertain, and must be left to the historians of PUS to answer. Brian Wynne is
admittedly aware of an unfortunate reception of some of his formulations regarding survey research and the
deficit model (personal communication, June 2006)
7 The European Commission’s Science and Society Action Plan (2001) states: “. . . there are indications that the
immense potential of our [scientific and technical] achievements is out of step with European citizens’ current
needs and aspirations . . .” (p. 7) and then proposes 38 actions to bring the two into line.
8 The UK GM Nation debate cost the government close to £1 million. A survey of public attitudes might cost
between £50,000 and £100,000, a set of focus groups around £20,000. This cost differential suggest a differential
indication, and all expenditures will ultimately have to be justified with added value, in particular if deliberation
should become policy routine and not just one-off experiments.
9 The NSF annual science indicators report for many years includes a chapter on public attitudes. Until 2001 the
NSF basically adopted Jon Miller’s framework model of literacy of 1983. Since then it is not clear what
framework informs the chapter on public understanding and attitudes in the US.
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